Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the literature on the political economy of policy instrument choice and relate it to the experiences in agriculture. This paper identifies two key bodies of literature that are at the core in explaining inefficient policy instruments:
(1)
Enforcement and commitment problems for promises of policies by politicians, and of voting by individuals (2) Information and agency problems between various participants in the political process
The theories are based on explicit politic-economic models in a rational actor framework. The models generally make prior assumptions about what policies are available without explaining these choices by either basic policy transactions costs or political economy models.
The analysis is extended to include the fact that often times instrument choice is a discrete 0,1 occurrence in response to a crisis and therefore is path dependent. Policy persistence is also widespread and so reasons for a status quo bias are provided. Furthermore, policy changes are often bundled economy wide and so are not specific to agriculture.
Finally, we analyze how effective trade agreements have been in improving policy instrument choice.
It is important to note that one cannot always analyze the politics of policy instrument choice alone. There is no dichotomy between means and ends because ends are themselves the means to a more final objective (e.g., re-election). Choosing a policy objective and choosing a policy instrument are therefore not separable processes. The politics of who gets the transfer and the level is simultaneous with the politics of policy instrument choice. As noted by Becker (1985) : "a satisfactory analysis of the choice of method must consider whether the influence function itself depends on the methods used." For example, farmers are powerful but why are there inefficient policy instruments? Or is policy instrument choice really independent of being powerful? For ease of exposition, we assume one group has more political power to begin with and then explain policy instrument choice.
It is also difficult to draw the line between explaining inefficient policies versus inefficient institutions (economic, political and legal) that generate these inefficient policy instruments. The focus here will be on policies and generally assumes institutions are exogenous. The political models evaluated in this paper revolve around distributional conflicts that invariably generate inefficient policy instrument choice.
Before we can develop a theory of inefficient policy instrument choice (for example, why are price supports used over lump sum transfers?), we must agree not only as to what is most efficient but also be able to rank alternative policies in terms of their efficiency in order to assess the trends in agricultural policy instrument choice worldwide. This is particularly important for ranking transfer efficiency, as the political roots of most agricultural policies are to transfer income to farmers.
The paper is therefore organized as follows. The next section provides a ranking of policies as to their transfer efficiency and determines the standard of evaluation, given that no policy is perfect in achieving its goals. The third section explores why political competition does not ensure that an efficient policy instrument is chosen. The following two sections explain the two key theories: enforcement and commitment problems in Section 4, and information and agency problems in Section 5. Section 6 presents the important GrossmanHelpman model of inefficient policy choice that falls outside these two general theories.
Section 7 describes how policy instrument choice in agriculture is often a discrete outcome in response to a crisis and therefore becomes path dependent, resulting in a status quo bias.
Section 8 describes how trade agreements can affect policy instrument choice. The final section gives some guidance as to the outstanding issues.
Determining the standard of evaluation
The basic tradition in economics is that an optimal government policy to remedy market failures (including the achievement of income distribution goals) is to maximize social welfare subject to constraints. Observed policies often appear to deviate from the optima. Taking international trade as an example, any restriction is inefficient (unless there is a non-economic goal or if a country wishes to exploit its terms of trade, an issue I return to later). Among trade restrictions, there have been a series of complex non-tariff import restrictions like voluntary export restraints, minimum price agreements and tariff rate import quotas. Meanwhile, domestic price support policies have been extremely complex with a myriad of provisions with loopholes and opportunities for adjusting behavior. Environmental regulations including those under the rubric of "multifunctionality" have also generally been inefficient. Biofuel polices are an example with a piecemeal proliferation of excessively costly methods of intervention (Koplow, 2007) . Furthermore, there is widespread evidence of an overall underinvestment in public goods with a bias for particular types (e.g., credit subsidies).
Because farm income goals has been the primary reason for agricultural trade and price support policies, especially in rich countries, a key question is what is the most efficient way to transfer income to farmers? Standard economic theory prescribes lump-sum transfers.
Some argue this is largely irrelevant for actual policy and prone to theoretical criticism because in order to operate this redistribution mechanism, the government would need to have knowledge of every single agent's preferences and endowment. But attempts to implement lump sum transfers inevitably destroys the incentives to acquire skill or reveal it in one's work as agents have no incentive to truthfully reveal that information. Because the government is not omnipotent, it will never be able to implement such a scheme (Hammond 1979 , Mirrlees, 1986 . There are also other unavoidable 'political transactions costs' like the transactions costs of administration, monitoring and compliance. To develop a political model that explains inefficient policy choice, ideally the policy availability set is also endogenous. Furthermore, because of the considerations above, the predictions of a nonpolitical model may very well coincide with the political model. The task of explaining inefficient policy choice is therefore very complex.
There is also the problem of endogeneity. Two different cases are relevant. First, some policy instruments are more vulnerable to rent-seeking. For example, Tullock (1983) , assuming imperfect information, argues that direct income payments, while more efficient in a standard economic analysis, generates unique incentives to rent seek and thus results in more redistribution and ultimately inefficiency. Alston (2007) (Swinnen and de Gorter 1998) . For example, the current debate over biofuel policies has proponents arguing these policies increase the price of corn and thereby reduces tax costs of farm subsidy programs. But the setting of loan rates and target prices themselves are affected by biofuel policies. Higher corn prices (and prices for related crops) give politicians an incentive to increase price supports compared to a situation of no biofuel policies and lower crop prices with burgeoning taxpayer costs. For example, the recent House Farm Bill proposes an increase in loan rates and target prices for several crops. Estimates of the welfare effects of one policy assuming other policies are unaffected can be seriously biased.
To summarize, because lump sum transfers are incentive incompatible, incur political transactions costs and can involve policy endogeneity, it is very difficult to decide on what the appropriate reference point for efficiency is. The standard of evaluation for efficiency is inevitably the first best in a second best world (or what is least bad). This is not an easy task to resolve. We now turn to some resolution of this issue.
Towards a ranking of efficient policy instruments
Before we can develop a political model explaining inefficient policy choice, we need to agree in principle as to what is efficient and be able to rank alternative policies in terms of their inefficiency. The approach taken in this paper is that there is a general ordering of policy efficiency, all the issues described above not withstanding. But before presenting this, let us assess the traditional literature on transfer efficiency.
The traditional approach is to compare individual policies in a general welfare theoretic framework along the lines of . 1 Even if the analysis includes multiple policy goals, interest groups and policy instruments, the two most important issues outstanding that cause disagreements among economists as to what policy is more efficient are (1) the marginal excess burden of taxation (MEB); and (2) a country being able to exploit their international terms of trade.
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The issue of the MEB of taxation and its role in assessing the efficiency of alternative agricultural policy instruments was first considered by Munk (1977 Munk ( , 1980 Munk ( , 1987 Munk ( , 1989 Munk ( , 1991 Munk ( , 1993 ) who argues producer co-responsibility levies and trade policies involving consumer transfers are more efficient than decoupled payments. This is what is known as the "double dividend" hypothesis in the environmental economics literature: you get to transfer monies to farmers at low cost because the deadweight costs of distortions in the agricultural market are low due to inelastic demand and supply while at the same time saving taxpayers costs, allowing for a reduction in general income taxes and thereby in the associated deadweight costs. This point was also highlighted by and analyzed further, among others, by Alston (1990; . The savings in the excess burden of wage taxes were purported to be 20-50 cents on the dollar (and as high as $1.50 on the dollar -see Feldstein, 1999 ).
The international terms of trade argument for government intervention has a long history in agricultural economics (see for example Schmitz et al., 1981 in each country's best interest not to try to exploit international terms of trade. 3 We therefore now turn our attention to the reason why the MEB of taxation should not be considered as a major factor in assessing the efficiency of alternative policy instruments in agriculture.
Why the MEB of taxation should not be a major factor
There are several problems with including the MEB of taxation in assessing the efficiency of alternative policy instruments in agriculture. First, if the MEB of taxation is included, then one also has to take into account the effect of the relative food price distortion with all other goods in economy (OECD 1994) . This means the MEB of taxation is inappropriately modeled because it brings in a general equilibrium effect in a partial equilibrium framework. The inefficiency created by a relative price distortion in agricultural prices relative to all other goods in the economy was first formalized by Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) . The burgeoning literature after this called it the "tax interaction effect."
Increased commodity prices magnify the deadweight costs of the pre-existing distortion (wage tax) because the commodity price spike reduces real wages and so discourages work.
The labor supply curve shifts left and this generates a rectangular deadweight costs (the tax base erodes as consumers substitute away from the taxed good). This requires a higher tax to maintain tax revenues. Subsequent research has shown the tax interaction effect is indeed important. For example, Browning's (1997) analysis of a monopoly finds that the tax interaction effect is 5-15 times the deadweight costs of a monopoly using standard partial equilibrium analysis. The empirical research by Goulder and Williams (2003) also finds that the tax interaction effect often dominates the Ramsey pricing effect of a spike in commodity prices. 4 Second, there are two distortions associated with an income tax: the 'distortionary effect' which is the welfare difference between a distorting tax and a lump-sum tax; and a 'revenue effect' which measures the welfare cost (gain) in disbursing the tax revenues. The MEB of taxation is based purely on compensated responses or the 'distortionary' effect.
Estimates derived by Fullerton (1991) concludes that the 'revenue effect' can be large, resulting in a 75 percent reduction in the MEB of taxation when these income effects were included.
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Third, once the marginal deadweight costs of consumer transfers in the agricultural market reaches the MEB of taxation, the optimal policy for any further transfers requires both taxpayer and consumer transfers. Once the consumer 'catch-up" tax has been reached; the complexity of now including decoupled payments introduces other possible sources of inefficiency.
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Finally, consumer transfers necessarily require trade restrictions that negate the mutual gains from policy disarmament worldwide. 7 We turn to that issue in the penultimate section of the paper.
The conclusion we therefore draw is that the first best policies to achieve farm income goals have the feature of no direct market interventions (free trade with no market price distortions). This necessarily means no international terms of trade improvements (except that experienced by all countries that all move to free trade) and the sole use of taxpayer financed transfers to farmers. The traditional model of transfer efficiency that compares production quotas involving consumer transfers with taxpayer financed payments does not apply, even if the MEB of taxation is high. Consumer transfers with import barriers and export subsidies are deemed inferior to taxpayer financed buyouts or decoupled payments (OECD 1994 (OECD , 2001 Dewbre et al.) , regardless if the MEB of taxation is high or low. 8 Even if the MEB is high, the decrease in U.S. GDP is sufficiently low that it will not significantly adversely affect other countries exports. The effect would be too indirect.
Ideally, governments would unilaterally eliminate all inefficient agricultural policies and replace them with policies that target the market failure. For income distribution goals, a one-time unconditional payment is preferred, a subsidy buy-out, to all engaged in farming or deemed in need of compensation as an annuity (bond) that is non-transferable to the farmer's successors, and non-renewable (Beard and Swinbank, 2001; Tranter 2004, Tangermann, 1991; Swinbank and Tangermann, 2001) . 9 However, the decoupling experience shows that there can be problems not only because of the design of programs and their implementation but also for political constraints. This indicates that with anything short of an ideal decoupling scheme, some distortions will continue. 10 Features that will increase the effectiveness of a less than ideal decoupling scheme include:
• Make payment program transitory and for adjustment purposes only.
• Strict payment limitations per farm and based on income rather than current or historical production.
• Require no constraints on input use.
• Implement credible and time consistent policies with no changes in the eligibility rules, payments or eligible sectors or farmers.
• Discontinue all other coupled programs.
• Bind payments and time frame in the WTO to prevent backsliding.
Why does a competitive political market not ensure efficiency?
A counterargument to the political economy literature on inefficient policy instrument choice is that competition in the political market place will ensure the most efficient policy instrument will be chosen (Stigler 1981; Wittman 1989; Becker 1976 ). Becker ( Most political economy models, including the revealed preference models with a policy criterion function, assume governments are efficient in achieving policy goals (Bullock 1995) . For example, both the collective action model of Becker (1983) and the politician-voter model of Swinnen and de Gorter (1993) assume full information and certainty on policy effects by all economic agents involved. Competition between collective action lobby groups in Becker (1983) and between politicians in Swinnen and de Gorter (1993) ensures that the most efficient instrument is used.
There is a weaker form of the hypothesis that governments tend to choose efficient policy instruments (Becker 1958; Gardner 1987) . Becker (1958) argues that there is relatively little to choose between an ideal free enterprise system and ideal political democracy but ignorance of voters and the large scale required of political organizations are two forces producing imperfections. Acemoglu (2003) argues that politics is special because of the complex interaction between politicians, voters, lobbies, legislatures and the bureaucracy.
There is empirical evidence of a tendency ( Empirical tests for policy instrument efficiency in agriculture have been undertaken and the conclusions are mixed (Gardner 1987; Beghin and Karp 1991; Bullock 1995) . The outcome is found to depend on the number of interest groups, policy goals and the set of policy instruments used or available.
The challenge is to identify what specific "transaction costs" would systematically prevent a competitive political market place from ensuring the choice of efficient policy instrument choice. The literature rules out efficient methods of redistribution and takes it for granted that rent-maximizing behavior by rulers or the government will result in inefficiencies. Andersen (1995) argues that trade policy is used over a more efficient subsidy because the latter has more concentrated costs on politically powerful group (urban capitalists). But why do politicians and powerful social groups not make a deal with the rest of the society to choose the policies and institutions that maximize output (or social welfare), and then redistribute part of the gains to themselves? We now discuss two general theories on why this does not occur.
Enforcement and commitment problems
Political promises are not formally legal contracts because contractual penalties are not enforceable by third parties. Governments or candidates may renege on their policy promises while citizens may renege on their promised votes (Acemoglu 2003 Political and economic trades between various individuals and groups are intertemporal, and need to rely on contracts and promises. Contracts and explicit promises by "the state" are non-enforceable. Allocation of political power creates an inherent commitment problem, undermining the potential to reach efficient outcomes. The commitment problem is twofold:
1. Politicians (incumbent or rival) cannot make commitments to bind their future actions 2. Voters cannot commit to politicians in the future, because the latter no longer possess the political power to enforce such promises As a result, efficiency considerations are not separable from distributional conflicts.
Incentive-compatible promises can make up for lack of enforceable contracts, but generally fall short of achieving the efficient outcome. Political and economic forces will sometimes push towards more efficient social arrangements. If the relationship between the state and the citizens is repeated, there may be some amount of commitment based on reputation, supported by the threat of future punishments. The possibility of commitment via constitutions or other institutions can substitute for a reputation-based commitment enforcement of contracts. The extent of distributional conflict between various groups in society will also affect the outcome (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001b ).
The inefficiencies do not arise because of political transactions costs mentioned earlier but because of the political-economic interactions between politicians, voters and interest groups.
For developing countries, Robinson and Verdier (2002) argue clientelism is key to induce voters to support its candidates. Patronage occurs for those who do support and there is an appeal to the collective interest in an effort to elicit votes. The hypotheses are that farmers with no power are taxed or in democracies, the farmers are not swing voters (instead perhaps ideological voters) or cannot solve the collective action problem. Institutional factors condition the outcome. For example, the fewer the constraints on the exercise of power, the worse policy will be. Situations that have more clientelism will generate less favorable agricultural policy.
Application of the enforcement and commitment theory to agriculture
In one of the more important papers on inefficient redistribution, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a) argue that inefficient redistribution policies in agriculture like price supports are enacted to encourage newcomers in order for farmers to maintain future political power. Choosing policy objectives are therefore not separable from choosing policy instruments.
Inefficient policy instruments are necessary to be consistent with the incentive compatibility constraint of the government. Because politicians cannot commit today to future policies and over some range, political power increases with group size, inefficient redistribution may arise as a way to expand or maintain the size of a group in order to sustain its future political power (not just reward those already engaged in the industry). To begin, Acemoglu and "…subsidized groups try to limit the entry of additional members because that dilutes the gains of established members… acreage restrictions encourage fewer farmers than output subsidies do…"
There are two problems with Becker's (1985) o U.S. marketing allotments, marketing and production quotas, base acres, price discrimination with marketing orders, restrictions on payments and eligibility, counter cyclical payments, MILC for dairy, CCPs, etc.
o EU "maximum guarantee quantities" -MGQs was probably one of the biggest inframarginal subsidy program of all times, converted to base acres and placed in the Blue Box in the URAA, co-responsibility levies, base acres, environmental crosscompliance and "multifunctionality" payments, etc.
o Production quotas in Canada, the EU and United States with restrictions on transfers between farms and provinces/countries/counties (e.g., 20 percent of quotas sales held back for entrants)
Information and agency problems
The basic premise is that politicians or lobby groups deceive voters or withhold Policy and politician uncertainty results in a concern by politicians about reputation and so inefficient instruments are chosen.
There are many variations of the commitment/information themes. Models are varied, including models with lobbying, elections, the legislature or bureaucracy. The importance of congressional committee structure is emphasized by Weingast and Marshall (1988 Grossman and Helpman (1995; 1996) If there is only one lobby, the government cannot bestow benefits on another lobby and get its contribution. The one lobby therefore gets the entire surplus. If there are two lobby groups or more, then the government gets the entire surplus in the form of contributions. If competition amongst lobbies is intense, the availability of an efficient instrument makes credible the government's threat to join forces with rival lobbies. It is therefore possible for lobbies to be better off with an inefficient policy instrument that ties the hands of government. This generates an equivalent outcome to basic models of lobbying by Becker (1983) or of politician-voter interaction by Swinnen and de Gorter (1993) but for different reasons. In both the Becker (1983) and Swinnen and de Gorter (1993) models, replacing an inefficient policy instrument with a more efficient one allows lobbies and politicians to achieve better results while using fewer resources in lobbying. In the Grossman-Helpman model, efficient policies result because government attaches some weight to social welfare.
The Grossman-Helpman theory of inefficient policy choice
If all voters are organized by a lobby, lobbies must contribute more to get free trade with an output subsidy (efficient) than with trade policy (inefficient) because a lobby must contribute the difference between what the government and other lobbies can achieve in the absence of the lobby's participation and what they get if it does lobby. Rival lobbies and government can achieve higher welfare without subsidies so the lobbies' contributions will be higher and net welfare of the lobby lower if the political regime allows for an efficient policy instrument. Therefore, extent of political competition determines preferences for alternative policy instrument types. If there is little competition, then lobbies want to extract resources at the expense of underrepresented majority and so an efficient instrument is desired.
The Grossman-Helpman result on inefficient policy choice occurs outside their model in that lobbies have an incentive to favor institutional change that restricts the ability of governments to choose an efficient policy instrument. This begs the question why lobbies would not favor instead institutional change to overcome the prisoner's dilemma facing them.
Furthermore, some argue that the inclusion of more interest groups was a reason for why agricultural policy reform in Australia was successful, a result that contradicts the prediction of the Grossman-Helpman model. Nevertheless, research by Acemoglu and Robinson find in developing countries that a more competitive political system generates lower quality institutions and policy choice it reduces flexibility for politicians to undertake policy reform.
Discrete policy changes, path dependency and the status quo bias
A distinguishing feature of agricultural policies is that once a policy is put in place, there is inertia in the political system with respect to changing the instrument, with changes made often only incrementally over long periods of time. This reflects both the path dependency of policy instrument choice and a bias for the status quo. The introduction or removal of policy measures has often been abrupt and major, and infrequent, often in response to a crisis. The crisis in the great depression initiated U.S. farm policy while the aftermath of WWII instigated the EU's agricultural policy. Meanwhile, marketing boards in Africa are holdovers from colonial times.
This means there is a need to explain the persistence of a policy instrument. One possible explanation is that the capitalization of program benefits means the benefits of the policy are only captured by incumbents at the time of the policy was introduced. This imposes severe harm on newcomers and so over time, the program does not benefit the people the program intended to help. Eliminating or reforming the policy instrument will harm those who bought the rights to the program benefits in the form of high asset values.
Coate and Morris (1999) reject the usual proposition that policy persistence arises from powerful interest groups defending current policies. Instead, they develop an agency model with lobbying where once a policy is introduced, agents make investments in order to benefit from them. This action increases their willingness to pay in the future and forego support for policies which provide temporary efficiency. This translates into political pressure to maintain the status quo. Implementation of a specific policy increases the political effectiveness of beneficiaries. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a, 2001b) argue that inefficient instruments serve in effect as commitment device because it may be harder to reverse than a lump-sum transfer. Dixit (1996) offers a theory where policy actions are durable; once implemented, they are not easily unwound. Vested interests defend the status quo because of the irreversible investments due to the policy. Buyouts are not available because of political transactions costs. Democratic political processes a bundle of political positions so path dependent inefficiency or lock-in results. Orden, Paarlberg, and Roe (1999) describe the "process establishment" such as producer associations and legislative committees that represents fixed institutional capital in U.S. politics that is most likely to be overcome only by some exogenous event. Psychology offers another explanation for the status quo bias. An important augmentation of the political support function for voter resistance to change is to incorporate Thaler's (1991) theory of the endowment income effect where people demand more to give it up than to acquire it. Another possibility would be to include prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) for politicians, support from voters, and voters' economic welfare. This would imply that the slope of the political support function is much steeper for losses. Loss aversion (where losses loom larger than gains) is a common psychological bias, independent of endowment incomes, so symmetry and reversibility of policy instrument choice does not hold. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) develop a theory of status quo bias whereby a future gain from an institutional reform is uncertain, and the distribution among various social groups is difficult to predict relative to the obvious loss of the specific group. Opposition to reform tends to be strongly organized while support is only weakly so. Their paper shows that some gainers or losers from reform cannot be identified ex ante. Many policy reforms that are politically sustainable ex post will not be adopted ex ante even though agents are risk-neutral, rational, and forward-looking. Uncertainty prevents reform and so large reform is needed to overcome the status quo bias. Basu, Jones, and Schlicht (1987) argue that developing countries continue to be trapped in economic stagnation and poverty under a dysfunctional system because of 'structural' and 'inertial' institutions or policies. The former are institutions bound and demanded by competing forces in response to transaction costs while the latter are institutions as products of history or origin (the importance of policy path dependency).
De Janvry and Sadoulet (1989) offer an explanation for the limited success of land reforms, which fail to be redistributive because governments first modernize large farms, which allows landlords to reinforce their political power. This allows them to receive credible commitments of non-expropriation if they modernize or lobby to externalize the cost of modernization such that expropriation with compensation becomes no longer feasible. De Janvry and Sadoulet (1989) use a game-theoretic framework between landlords and government by integrating lobbying with government behavior to show that policy change is a path-dependent sequence of events. Governments have a short-term political horizon and high discount rate for economic gains such that future losers block policy change.
Not only are policy changes often discrete, there are also often bundled (economy wide) rather than focusing on agriculture alone. New Zealand is a case in point where an economic crisis precipitated micro and macro reforms where all agricultural policy interventions were abandoned, all service sectors where de-regulated, free trade was implemented, FDI was encouraged and the exchange rate was allowed to float freely. Similar outcomes occurred in Latin American countries in the past two decades. the negotiation) and legal framing (that deepens the negotiation), while independent forces, increase the stakes and change the aggregation of domestic interests (Davis, 2003) .
Impact of trade agreements on policy instrument choice
Historically, GATT rules on agriculture, however, were shaped around U.S. farm policy. But agriculture is slowly moving away from being an exception. It is debatable how much trade liberalization has occurred in the WTO specifically. 12 But the WTO has allowed for a more inclusive distribution of bargaining power where before WTO negotiations on agriculture were a gladiatorial contest between the United States and the EU. During the Uruguay Round, the CAIRNS group surfaced and the G-20 has made a large impact in the Doha Round negotiations.
A major incentive for large and small countries alike is to enter trade agreements that lower or eliminate trade distorting policy interventions to capture the mutual gains from policy disarmament, thereby escaping the prisoner's dilemma and also lowers adjustment costs (Bagwell and Staiger 1999; Grossman and Helpman 1995) . 
Mexico's Experience
Mexico's dominant political party had electoral support of millions of maize peasants so for political reasons felt compelled to continue subsidizing maize farmers but in a different way. NAFTA therefore provided pressure for Mexico to change their policy instrument choice. The option Mexico chose was decoupled payments based on historical acreage. There was a problem however as there were no land titles so some economists declared the option dead on arrival. But decoupled payments were nevertheless introduced but not before Tullock (1989) where rent seeking may be higher with a seemingly more efficient policy instrument and to Alston (2007) where transitory cash payments are found to be inferior to wholesale policy reform because the former get locked into same status quo bias. 
Concluding remarks on decoupling
This paper provides an overview of the literature on the political economy of policy instrument choice. Before developing theories of inefficient policy instrument choice, a resolution of outstanding disagreements in the literature as to what is efficient had to be resolved. The disagreements center on the MEB of taxation and the international terms of trade effects. For various reasons, we concluded that neither should be a major consideration in ranking the efficiency of alternative policy instruments.
We then explore why political competition does not ensure that an efficient policy instrument is chosen. This leads us to two key theories based on political economic models that provide powerful and relevant explanations for inefficient policy instrument choice in agriculture: enforcement and commitment problems for promises of policies by politicians, and of voting by individuals; and information and agency problems between various participants in the political process. We also evaluate the important Grossman-Helpman model of inefficient policy choice that falls outside these two general theories.
The analysis is extended to include the fact that often times instrument choice is a discrete 0,1 occurrence in response to a crisis and therefore is path dependent. Policy persistence is also widespread and so reasons for a status quo bias are provided. The paper gave examples of how governments tend toward taxpayer financed decoupled agricultural policies, which is a step in the right direction in improving the efficiency of policy instrument choice. But the reforms have been slow and decoupled type payments are concentrated mostly in the grains and oilseeds sectors. The degree of decoupling is a continuum, with payments based on land constraints or input use, historical entitlements or on individual characteristics not related to farming being considered far less distorting than the traditional measures of border protection and direct input and production subsidies (OECD 1994 (OECD , 2001 ). But there is no fully decoupled agricultural support measure in theory or in practice. But the reality is more complex, not only in the economic impacts of decoupled payments on producer behavior but also the characteristics of the programs themselves in their implementation. Abler and Blandford (2005) identify five general categories of mechanisms for how decoupled payments influence output, even though they are not linked to current farm-level production. Payments, especially if they are large, can reduce farmers' aversion to risk through the 'wealth effect'. Depending on how payments are disbursed, the variability of farm income can also be reduced, thereby reducing risk facing farmers that leads to increased output (the 'insurance effect'). Decoupled payments can affect farmers' investment and exit decisions through relaxing constraints facing them in capital and labor markets. Direct payments allow banks to make loans that they otherwise would not and allow farmers with specialized skills to stay in agriculture. Because eligibility rules have changed, expectations about future policies and dynamic considerations affect current production decisions because producers develop expectations about future assistance based on past government actions.
Payments help farmers cover short run production costs, slowing structural change in agriculture.
Although the experience is that perfectly designed decoupled payments can distort trade which can be exacerbated if decoupled programs are implemented imperfectly, the evidence still corroborates the OECD (1994, 2001) finding that taxpayer funded decoupled payments are more efficient than traditional forms of market interventions. The primary motivation for decoupling is to compensate farmers for the move to free markets by providing transitional adjustment assistance. This also makes the programs politically more palatable and transparent. Ideally, compensation programs would be universal (open to all sectors in the economy, not just agriculture) or at least non-sector specific within agriculture.
A simple and minimally distorting scheme would be a one-time unconditional payment to everyone engaged in farming or deemed in need of compensation that is nontransferable, along the lines of one-time buyouts.
However, because a one-time buyout is an unlikely outcome (unless it is well targeted in one sector), specific attention should be given to time limits, harmonization with other support programs, government credibility, and constraints on input use. Unless these aspects are properly addressed, decoupled programs are likely to have the same detrimental effects as other subsidy programs.
Most important, programs should be strictly limited in duration. The United States had (at least implicitly) one in the 1996 Farm Bill but violated it three years later. Mexico's reform had a time limit, which so far has not been extended. A time limit helps to ensure that payments are made for adjustment purposes only. If there are other (coupled) support programs, the decoupled program may not eliminate the incentives to overproduce. In the United States, for example, coupled support programs have been maintained or new ones added.
To maintain government credibility and reduce uncertainty, eligibility rules need to be clearly defined and not allowed to change. The time period on which payments are based, the level of payments and the sectors covered should all remain fixed. Updating bases and adding crops create a government credibility problem, making the decoupling policy time inconsistent. If governments have the discretion to change eligibility criteria and payments as market conditions change, these commitments will not be viewed as binding. Farmers, meanwhile, will change their production decisions to reflect this, thus undermining decoupling. Support to specific sectors within agriculture should be in the form of taxpayerfunded payments. There should be no requirement of production. Land, labor, and any other input should not have to be in "agricultural use." Experience shows the difficulty of designing effective decoupling schemes. But strict criteria are required to minimize inefficiencies. One way to improve the performance of decoupling schemes might be to have the WTO specify the conditions.
